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1. Introduction 
Amongst the numerous studies of consumer expenditure,2 the issue of the existence 
and size of wealth effects in the consumption function has come to the fore strongly in recent 
years. This is partly a consequence of the strength of consumption and low level of savings in 
the United States in the late 1990s (see inter alia Ludvigsen and Steindel, 1999, Poterba, 
2000, and IMF, 2000), which is often thought to be linked to rising share prices and resultant 
wealth effects.3 A major fall in equity prices could conversely lead to a sharp fall in 
consumption with wider effects on the macroeconomy. Equally, strong shifts in asset prices, 
as in Scandinavia and the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s, may have amplified the 
business cycle partly via wealth effects on consumption, linked to credit expansion (Berg and 
Bergstrom, 1995, and Davis, 1995). Similar arguments may apply to the current weakness of 
consumption in Japan. 
In more detail, wealth effects on consumption generally are coming increasingly to the 
fore, firstly owing to macroeconomic trends. The ratio of wealth to income and consumption 
is rising in the major industrial economies, suggesting that the ability to draw on wealth to 
maintain consumption is increasing (see Charts 8-14 discussed in Section 3). But there are 
also reasons for interest in disaggregated wealth, such as the aforementioned recent pattern of 
negative saving in the US accompanying rapid consumption growth. In terms of 
macroeconomic policy, the link from wealth to consumption gives a reason for interest in the 
effect of asset prices on the aggregate economy. Hence the possible need for monetary policy 
makers to focus on asset prices as well as consumer prices (Gertler et al., 1998, and 
Woodford, 1994).4 The case is strengthened by the role of asset prices in “credit cycles” in the 
late 1980s. An attempt at disaggregation can cast further light on these issues by highlighting 
                                                                 
2 See Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995) for a comprehensive survey of empirical work on consumption. 
3 In the US between 1994 and 1997 alone, the value of household sector equity holdings doubled. 
4 See also the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s (1999) symposium on asset prices and monetary policy at 
Jackson Hole and Stock and Watson (2001). 
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which asset prices are most relevant for consumption. There could also be light cast on 
whether households react to the variance as well as the mean level of asset prices and 
resultant values of their assets (i.e. whether they react strongly to increased risk). 
Financial liberalisation may lead to changes in wealth effects. Free availability of 
credit may reduce the importance of income as a determinant of consumption. Borrowing may 
develop a strong independent, and at times even positive, effect on consumption, which may 
not be consistent with conventional consumption functions, which assume a negative sign for 
borrowing in the construction of net wealth. In this context, the effect of debt on consumption 
might also differ according to the level of gearing and the stage of the business cycle, being 
favourable to consumption at low levels of borrowing, but negative when there is high gearing 
and a downturn in the economy. Or, as suggested by De Bondt (1999), there may be effects 
on consumption operating via the “credit channel” and the cost of external finance, which will 
in turn relate to the gearing of the household sector. Meanwhile, the rise in home ownership 
offers a sizeable asset to an increasing number of households, against which the value of 
which they may borrow at relatively low cost compared to unsecured consumer credit. 
However, if such borrowing becomes sizeable, there may be repercussions (negative equity) 
when house prices fall, which may dampen consumption while households correct their 
balance sheets, to a degree in excess of that expected from prior relationships. 
The institutionalisation of saving, and in particular the growing share of household 
wealth held in the form of life insurance and pension funds (Davis and Steil 2001), raises the 
question of whether the relative illiquidity of such wealth may give it a weaker wealth effect 
than directly held and liquid wealth. On the other hand, the decreasing elements of insurance 
(e.g. in the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension funds) which would 
otherwise insulate the beneficiary from asset price changes, could increase the wealth effect 
from this source. Linking to this, the ageing of the population is helping to drive an increased 
accumulation of wealth, independent of other motives for saving. There is an interest in how 
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consumption will evolve as population ageing and related accumulation of assets proceeds. 
Possibly the time horizon over which consumers expect to de-cumulate their asset holdings 
may vary, which in turn might affect the size of the wealth effects. 
A number of recent studies have as a consequence of these developments investigated 
the properties of total net wealth as a determinant of consumption. However, rather fewer 
studies have sought to disaggregate wealth and assess whether rises in sub-components of 
wealth have differential effects on consumption. And even those that do attempt this are rarely 
undertaken on a comparative, cross-country basis or with sectoral balance sheet data as 
opposed to proxies using asset prices. This paper hence seeks to break new ground by 
presenting and comparing data and estimates of the relation between components of personal 
or household sector wealth and consumers’ expenditure for the US, UK, Germany, France, 
Italy, Japan and Canada. We basically employ a backward looking specification for aggregate 
consumption where the long-run relationship between consumption, income and wealth is 
estimated within an error correction model. We then seek to disaggregate the existing long-
run wealth terms within our established short-run model. We consequently test whether the 
typical imposition of an equivalent long-run elasticity for the components of wealth is 
consistent with the data. Differences in the impact of the components of wealth have been 
found by a few papers studying US consumption. For example, Brayton and Tinsley (1996) 
find that the marginal propensity to consume out of stock market wealth is less than half that 
out of other types of wealth. We examine whether this kind of result stands up for other G7 
countries and in doing so we can compare similarities of the major European countries. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section Two we illustrate the data currently 
available for the G7 countries, showing major contrasts and common trends within the 
balance sheet of the household sector. In the third section we briefly note the theoretical 
background which could justify inclusion of wealth in a consumption function, and 
implications of its disaggregation; the section also looks at recent empirical work on wealth 
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effects in consumption, which including extant work disaggregating wealth (usually on a 
single country basis). The fourth section presents our own results. In the conclusion we seek 
to draw out some underlying features and policy implications of these outturns. 
 
2. Patterns of Wealth Holding in the G7 
Whereas the points highlighted in the introduction apply to individual G-7 countries, 
there are very marked differences in patterns of wealth holding across the G7, with in 
particular a much lower level of equity and institutional holdings in Continental Europe than 
in the English speaking countries. This could affect the responsiveness of consumption to 
wealth via (i) similar coefficients on the components of wealth, but different size of the asset 
components within the portfolio and/or (ii) different coefficients as well as different portfolio 
composition. It is important to test for the relative importance of these effects via a 
disaggregated wealth study, such as the work presented here, so as to calibrate correctly 
wealth effects. Besides being relevant across groups of countries, any remaining differences 
in wealth effects within Continental Europe will render more complex the task of the ECB to 
conduct monetary policy. In this context, it is worth noting that EMU is widely seen as 
leading to an increase in the relative importance of securities markets and institutional 
investors (Davis, 1999). 
We now go on to outline patterns in the data in more detail. Charts 1-7 present trends 
in the composition of gross financial wealth in the G7. These are drawn from the National 
Flow of Funds Balance Sheet tables prepared by the National Central Banks of France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and the US and by the National Statistical Offices in the UK and 
Canada. There are a number of important differences in the time series behaviour of this data. 
In particular, Canada, the UK and US show a higher proportion of institutional saving, while 
liquid asset holdings tend to be lower. Over time this trend has grown in strength, with a sharp 
decline in the share of liquid assets in the US from 25% up to the end of the 1980s down to 
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12% now. Over the same period equity holdings have risen from 15% to over 30% while long 
term institutional saving has also risen from 23% to over 30%. In the UK, liquid asset 
holdings have fallen from 40% of the portfolio in the early 1980s to 20% now, while life and 
pension fund saving rose from 30% to over 50%, and equities from 15% to over 20%. In 
Canada the shifts are less dramatic, but there is a rise in the share of life insurance and 
pension funds from 30% to 40%, offset by falls in direct holdings of equities and bonds. 
Underlying the decline in liquidity, besides relatively higher returns on capital uncertain 
assets, is financial liberalisation, which has reduced the need for precautionary liquid asset 
holdings. 
On the other hand, differences between the Anglo Saxon countries and Continental 
Europe should not be exaggerated, as there is some degree of convergence, which depending 
on the coefficients in the consumption function could also imply a convergence of behaviour. 
In particular, the share of liquid assets in France and Italy, which in the 1970s was over 60% 
of gross personal sector financial assets, has now more than halved in response to rising 
equity5 and institutional investment (in France) and rising equity and bond holdings (in Italy). 
This pattern is also present in a muted form for Germany, where bond holdings have 
increased relatively strongly. Japan is an exception in that liquidity has retained its 
dominance, accounting for around 60% of portfolios in 1966 and 1998. Whereas convergence 
had been apparent till 1990, the securities market crises of the 1990s have evidently driven 
households back to low risk assets. Even the rise in life insurance and pension funds’ share 
reached a plateau in the early 1990s. 
It is also useful to consider patterns of aggregate wealth as a proportion of personal 
disposable income (pdi). As shown in charts 8-14 there is a common pattern across all seven 
countries of a rise in gross wealth relative to pdi, and a generally more muted rise in debt/pdi 
ratios. Corresponding to these patterns, there has also been an increase in net wealth/pdi. 
                                                                 
5 For France and Italy, data for equity include equity in non-corporate business, which is not included elsewhere. 
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The levels of the gross wealth ratio differ between around 5 for the US and UK and 
around 3 for Continental Europe, Canada and Japan. While this no doubt partly relates to 
differences in measurement, it may also link to the funded pension systems in the Anglo 
Saxon countries shown in the wealth data, where a larger part of wealth of households in 
France, Germany, Italy and Japan is in the form of implicit social security wealth. Meanwhile, 
debt/pdi ratios are around 1 in Canada, the US, UK, Japan and Germany, while in France they 
are around 0.6 and 0.3 in Italy. This partly reflects a cultural aversion to debt in Italy as well 
as more recent financial liberalisation. In France debt ratio stood at around 0.8 in the late 
1980s, and declined during the period of recession and falling asset prices of the early 1990s. 
The German ratio may be exaggerated by inclusion of construction company liabilities along 
with mortgage debt in the so-called “housing sector” of the financial accounts. A notable 
feature of the UK in the 1990s is that the debt/pdi ratio has been flat after having risen sharply 
in the 1980s mortgage-lending boom. In Japan the data include debt of unincorporated 
businesses, which is sizeable. 
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
We estimate benchmark consumption functions based on the Life Cycle Hypothesis 
(LCH) of Ando and Modigliani (1963) as derived in Deaton (1992). In the LCH, planned 
aggregate consumption ( *tC ) is a function of total resources. Total resources are the sum of 
human wealth ( tH ) and net financial wealth ( 1-tW ). Therefore planned consumption can 
consequently be expressed as  
    ( )1* -+= ttt WHmC       (1) 
where m is the marginal propensity to consume out of total resources on average across the 
population. There are two difficulties with estimating equation (1) directly. First, planned 
consumption does not always equal actual consumption owing inter alia to lags in adjustment, 
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which suggest using an error correction approach. Secondly, human wealth is unobservable 
and typically proxied by some function of current labour income (i.e. tt kYH =
~ ). 
Consequently, we can derive the following, where tC  is actual consumption and tC
~  is target 
consumption (equivalent to planned consumption but based on a specification using the 
human wealth proxy, tH
~ ): 
ttt CC e+=
~        (2) 
( ) tttt WHmC e++= -1~       (3) 
tttt bWaYC e++= -1       (4) 
Further modifications are warranted to estimate this specification of the consumption 
function. As suggested by Campbell and Deaton (1989), income in levels is unlikely to be 
difference stationary. In particular, the first difference of the level of income does not display 
constant variance: earlier increases in the level of income, in any reasonable sample of data, 
are likely to be substantially less than increases later in the sample. This non-constant 
variance would mean our short run error correction model for consumption would have non-
stationary dynamics and the long-run relationship for consumption would potentially be 
spurious, given that not all of our variables are difference stationary. Consequently we adopt a 
logarithmic approximation for equation (4) to ensure that income, in natural logs, is difference 
stationary and hence that our long-run relationship can be non-spurious. The logarithmic 
approximation to equation (4) is as follows 
( ) ( ) ( ) tttt WYcC xba +++= -10 lnlnln      (5) 
This is the approach adopted in recent work by Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), Davis and 
Palumbo (2001), Lettau, Ludvigson and Barczi (2001) and Lettau and Ludvigson 
(2001a,b,c,d). See also Campbell and Deaton (1989), Campbell and Mankiw (1991) and 
Nelson (1987) for a fur ther discussion on logarithmic approximations of the aggregate life 
cycle consumption function in equation (4). 
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A short run model which has a loglinear approximation of equation (4) as a 
cointegrating vector can be derived from the work by Davidson, Hendry, Srba and Yeo 
(1978). This approach nests consumption within an error correction term and allows for a 
significant role for current income. Hendry von Ungern-Sternberg (1981) extended this paper 
by including a measure of net wealth as an integral control mechanism. They derived a 
consumption function from a utility maximisation problem with a quadratic loss function 
thus: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ][ ]*-*--** ----+-+-= 1142132221 2 ttttttttttt ccccccccwwq llll            (6) 
An asterisk indicates the long run equilibrium level of consumption and wealth and all lower 
case variables are in natural logs. The first two terms represent deviations of planned wealth 
and consumption from target, the third term is adjustment costs and the fourth is a slippage 
term. This solves to an error correction model of the form 
( ) ( )11311210 ---- -+-+D+=D tttttt ywcyyc qqqq               (7) 
Equation (7) can be reparameterised to produce a short run equation of the form  
( )111110 --- --+D+=D ttttt wycyc bagqq      (8) 
It should be noted that specification (8) incorporates equation (4) but wealth, income and 
consumption are contemporaneously cointegrated. Below we estimate equation (8) as our 
benchmark consumption function after including additional data-determined short run 
dynamics. 
The derivation above assumes that non-human wealth is homogeneous. However, this 
is not the case either in terms of liquidity or capital certainty, which may suggest that the 
effects of its sub-components on consumption may vary. Moreover, the household sector is 
not homogeneous, for example in terms of (i) total wealth of households and (ii) stage of the 
life cycle. Both of these may affect the portfolio composition of the household and its 
response to changes in the components of wealth. 
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In this context, a priori, it is plausible that in a liquidity-constrained situation, net 
liquid assets will strongly affect consumption, as well as disposable income. In such a 
situation (i.e. where credit is not readily available), the liquidity of an asset is the key aspect 
of its substitutability for consumer goods, and hence less liquid assets such as equities and life 
and pension claims, will have a smaller effect on consumption than liquidity. Moreover, the 
key component of net liquidity will be (gross) liquid assets rather than indebtedness,6 since 
the latter is constrained ex hypothesi. (A similar argument holds for the income effect on 
consumption, which will be large for liquidity constrained consumers.) 
However, when liquidity constraints ease, both the importance of liquid assets and of 
disposable income may well decline. The former will be less important than total wealth, 
which indicates resources available over the life cycle for consumption, against which the 
household may borrow. Whether there will be differences in the view taken by the household 
in respect of types of wealth (and hence their weight in the consumption decision) is less clear 
a priori, for the following reasons. 
On the one hand, liquid assets will remain by definition a closer substitute for 
consumption than illiquid ones, and especially contractual saving such as life and pension 
fund claims. Also illiquid assets may be concentrated in fewer hands than liquid ones 
(although this is less the case when there is a funded pension system). On the other hand, if 
households tend to shift to a greater proportion of illiquid wealth as their overall wealth 
increases and liquidity constraints ease (because they are willing to take higher risk on part of 
the portfolio in exchange for higher return), the valuation of such illiquid wealth could come 
to the fore as an indicator of consumption. Moreover, rises in debt as liquidity constraints ease 
may also lead to a reduction in the measured effect of liquidity (since a rise in borrowing to 
finance consumption gives a “negative wealth effect”). Meanwhile, disposable income will 
                                                                 
6 Net liquid assets are typically defined to include total household debt as a negative variable (as it is a liability). 
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become at most an indicator of human wealth for life cycle purposes. It is the relative 
importance of these arguments that this article seeks to test. 
The above discussion has implications for the income variable used in consumption 
function estimation. The conventional approach is to include real personal disposable income 
in the consumption function. However, if wealth is to be included in the consumption 
function, to avoid the risk of double counting it may be appropriate for one to omit property 
income from the income variable, and use post tax income from employment and self 
employment plus current grants minus social security contributions (see the discussion in 
Muellbauer and Lattimore 1995). We evaluate both variables in our work reported in Section 
4. 
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3.2 Aggregate Wealth  
We now go on to assess recent empirical work on wealth and consumption, beginning 
with specifications that do not disaggregate wealth. The inclusion of only liquid assets was the 
typical practice in a number of early consumption functions following Hendry and von 
Ungern Sternberg (1981) and earlier work such as Townend (1978) for the Bank of England 
(see the survey in Davis, 1984). Income is in some of these studies adjusted for inflation 
losses on net liquid assets (as part of interest payments, which enter personal disposable 
income, are implicitly capital repayments). Alternatively, it has been popular to incorporate an 
inflation variable which is a proxy for the capital loss on nominally denominated wealth in 
periods of inflation (see Davidson et al. 1978, and recent expositions of the approach in 
Pesaran et al., 1999, and Carruth et al., 1999).  
This practice of focusing on nominal- fixed, liquid wealth was partly a consequence of 
data limitations for illiquid wealth, but also expressed a view that liquid assets were in a sense 
closer substitutes for consumption than illiquid wealth such as shares and pension wealth. 
Liquid assets might be especially relevant when there are constraints on borrowing, and 
indeed later practice has tended to use wider wealth aggregates, sometimes also including 
housing wealth as well as financial wealth. Brodin and Nymoen (1992) show that financial 
deregulation effects are well captured in Norway by the wealth variable. 
According to Boone et al. (1998), Starr-McCluer (1998) and Brayton and Tinsley 
(1996) studies of the US find that the MPC out of Net Wealth is between 1% and 7%. There is 
no strong evidence of any wealth effect for France according to Bonner and Dubois (1995) 
and Grunspan and Sicsic (1997), although Carruth (1999) finds evidence for a wealth effect 
using an inflation proxy. Rossi and Visco (1995) find for Italy that the marginal propensity to 
consume out of net wealth is equal to 3.5%. Generally, the literature finds weaker wealth 
effects in Continental Europe and Japan than in the US, the UK and Canada. 
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Decisions about the construction of a wealth variable are dependent upon issues like 
liquidity and intergenerational aggregation and lessons can be drawn from this literature when 
examining disaggregate wealth. Liquidity considerations may suggest that different assets 
have different weights in an aggregate measure. An increase in housing wealth for current 
homeowners represents a decrease in future income for prospective homeowners. Muellbauer 
and Lattimore (1995) find that house prices have a dual effect implied by theory: a positive 
wealth effect (which depends on the degree of liquidity of housing) and a negative real price 
effect. These effects may be different for different countries. Home ownership levels in 
Europe range from 66% in the United Kingdom and 54% in France to 38% in Germany (see 
Boone et al., 1998). The importance of housing wealth in the consumption function is 
possibly a function of the level of home ownership. Housing wealth is not the only point of 
contention with regards the impact of wealth’s components on consumption. For example, 
stock market wealth is concentrated amongst the very wealthy who may have a relatively low 
propensity to consume as wealth rises. Finally, Carroll (1994) demonstrates that on average 
the level of consumption is closely related to current income and liquid assets rather than 
measures of human wealth, suggesting that non-marketable wealth may not be particularly 
related to consumption. 
3.3 Disaggregated Wealth 
One early study of disaggregate wealth by Pesaran and Evans (1984) suggested it was 
insufficient to include solely capital gains and losses from liquid wealth in the consumption 
function. They consequently developed a specification that also incorporates illiquid assets. 
Estimating in terms of saving, they find superior results with their approach to that of 
competing alternatives, with capital gains and losses being highly significant in explaining the 
savings ratio, based on annual UK data between 1953-1981. 
Recent work on disaggregation has included Boone et al. (1998), also explicitly 
consider the effect of stock market wealth on consumption. They estimate a consumption 
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function for the US using financial wealth, which is based on the following linear 
approximation to the equilibrium relationship in logarithmic form  
  cyt = a + ß(smwy)t + ?(nsmwy)t + other determinants  
    (9) 
Where cyt is the consumption to income ratio (hence there is implicit imposition of 
homogeneity), smwyt is the stock market wealth to income ratio and nsmwyt is non-stock 
market wealth to income ratio (all variables are in logs). Stock market wealth consists of 
corporate equities (held directly and those in close-end funds) plus mutual fund shares and life 
insurance reserves. Due to difficulties obtaining reliable data for G7 countries other than the 
US, Boone et al. (1998) use share prices to proxy capital gains and losses. The US marginal 
propensity to consume is then re-scaled by the share of equities in disposable income for each 
of the other countries. In their long-run specification for consumption the authors also 
incorporate the real interest rate, the inflation rate and the unemployment rate as the other 
determinants of the consumption income ratio. The real interest rate is included to take 
account of substitution effects, the inflation rate to take account of uncertainty and real 
depreciation of non- indexed financial assets, and thirdly the unemployment rate is included to 
measure uncertainty surrounding the future stream of income. They incorporate the long-run 
cointegrating relationship in a dynamic error correction model. Using the OECD macromodel 
INTERLINK, they find significant real effects from a fall in G7 stock markets. For example 
for the US a ten percent fall in stock market prices reduces consumption by 0.75 per cent after 
allowing for indirect equity holdings, for the UK and Canada 0.45 and other G7 countries less 
than 0.2. 
Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) have also conducted a recent study of consumption in 
the US where they differentiate between stock market wealth and non-stock market wealth. 
Total wealth is household net wealth in billions of current dollars. Stock market wealth 
includes direct household holdings, mutual fund holdings, holdings of private and public 
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pension plans, personal trusts and insurance companies. Using a loglinear specification to 
avoid heteroskedasticity, they find evidence of similar impact from non-stock market wealth 
and stock market wealth, for a sample period that runs from 1953Q1 to 1997Q4 (the elasticity 
is approximately 0.04 for both effects) although they report some instability. However, the 
estimated stock market effect is sensitive to the sample period chosen and there is some 
evidence of instability from a likelihood ratio test. For a sample period that contains only ten 
years of their most recent data the authors find a diminished stock market wealth effect 
(elasticity is 0.21) and a negative elasticity on non-stock market wealth. 
We have drawn attention to some of the issues involved when deciding the appropriate 
definition of non-human wealth. Church et al. (1994) and Ogawa et al. (1996) emphasise that 
we should differentiate according to the degree of liquidity. The US model of the FRB 
emphasises the difference between (1) transfer wealth, (2) property wealth, (3) corporate 
equity, and (4) other net financial and tangible asset wealth. (see Brayton and Tinsley, 1996). 
The marginal propensity to consume out of stock market wealth is half of what the MPC is 
out of other components of net wealth. 
Regarding pension funds these are often considered as illiquid assets with a tenuous 
effect on consumption. Nevertheless, Poterba and Samwick (1995) suggest that the 
consumption patterns of those with pension plans exhibits a higher degree of correlation with 
the stock market than those without. Equally, according to Starr-McCleur (1998) the 
correlation between equity prices and aggregate activity has not been due to any direct stock 
market effect. She uses survey data of US households and finds that any effect of the stock 
market on saving and consumption behaviour arises primarily through retirement saving in 
the form of mutual funds and retirement accounts. The rising trend of pension plan ownership 
in the US and elsewhere would imply that it is pertinent to include pension funds in stock 
market wealth when modelling consumption. 
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Housing is a form of wealth, not included in our work in this paper, partly for data 
reasons; some researchers on individual countries have sought to include it in consumption 
functions. Berg and Bergstrom (1995) disaggregate wealth as housing and net financial wealth 
in an error correction model for Swedish consumption. Household debt is an important 
determinant of short run behaviour, suggesting credit rationing. Additiona lly, financial wealth 
is crucial in explaining long-run consumption while housing wealth is often found to be 
insignificant. 
A number of researchers associated with John Muellbauer find a negative effect from 
house prices to consumption, generally in a specification which also includes the disaggregate 
stock of assets. For example, Murata (1994) finds a negative effect of land prices for Japan. 
The asset disaggregation is imposed as a 2/1 ratio between the weight imposed on liquid and 
illiquid assets. Lattimore (1993) finds a negative effect from house prices for Australia, while 
in Muellbauer and Murphy (1994) estimates using UK regional consumption data also show 
this effect. Kennedy and Anderson (1994) find evidence of mixed effects from house price 
increases upon consumption, for a range of OECD countries. 
Note that virtually all of the results outlined above utilise real personal (or household) 
disposable income as the income variable and not, as suggested in Section 3, non-property 
income excluding rent, interest and dividend receipts. The main exception are the Muellbauer 
studies which calculated the latter, and some of the early work on inflation and liquid assets, 
which adjusted income for the inflation losses on net liquid assets. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Baseline Estimates Using Aggregate Wealth 
In the light of the above, we constructed a data set using the flow of funds data 
illustrated in Section 2 (liquidity, bonds, shares, life/pension funds and debt) and standard 
macroeconomic variables (consumption, Ct, and real personal disposable income, Yt).7 We 
assume that the logged variables are I(1) or difference stationary. This is consistent with the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test results included in the Appendix (Table A1.1). Only the non-
property income series (for four countries) provide consistent evidence against difference-
stationarity.  
Our econometric approach involved testing various breakdowns of wealth in the 
context of “baseline” consumption specifications. The baseline consumption estimates for the 
G7 are given in Table 4.1. The regressions are estimated by non- linear least squares and the 
sample period is 1972Q2 to 1998Q4 for all countries to allow direct comparison. In the 
presence of non-stationary data we avoid using a static regression approach by utilising a 
dynamic error correction approach (as advocated by Banerjee et al., 1993, and Maddala and 
Kim, 1998, see also the discussion in Section 3.1). Consequently the estimated models feature 
a common error-correction formulation, with the long run having terms in real personal 
disposable income and real net wealth, as follows 
               ( ) ktijtitttt YCWYCC ----- D+D+--+=D lnlnlnlnlnln 1211110 ggbbaa   (10) 
Summing up the results as shown in Table 4.1, whereas there are a variety of significant 
dynamic terms and dummy variables, overall there is a reasonable degree of similarity in the 
specifications for the G7 countries. All error correction terms ( 1a ) are significant at the 5% 
level (apart from that for Italy, which was only significant at the 10% level) and of a 
reasonable size. The wealth term in the long-run relationship for France was not found to be  
                                                                 
7 All data series are quarterly. The quarterly wealth time series for Germany, France, Italy and Canada is 
interpolated annual data using changes in broad money for liquid and changes in equity prices for illiquid assets. 
This is the approach suggested by Chow and Lin (1971). 
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Table 4.1 G7 Baseline Consumption Equations  
 US UK Germany France Italy Canada Japan 
a0 0.035 
(1.0) 
-0.028 
(0.3) 
 0.036 
(1.0) 
-0.005 
(0.1) 
-0.088 
(0.7) 
 0.056 
(0.5) 
 
a1*lnCt-1 -0.157 
(3.3) 
-0.147 
(3.5) 
-0.258 
(4.7) 
-0.097 
(3.3) 
-0.060 
(2.7) 
-0.267 
(4.7) 
-0.147 
(2.9) 
ß1*lnYt-1 0.847 
(15.3) 
0.862 
(10.4) 
 0.852 
(15.8) 
0.805 
(4.0) 
0.992 
(5.3) 
0.790 
(15.8) 
0.828 
(31.1) 
ß2*lnWt-1 0.113 
(4.3)  
0.133 
(3.9)  
0.089 
(3.3) 
0.163 
(2.3) 
0.095 
(2.2)  
0.160 
(8.0)  
0.136 
(6.2) 
?1*?lnYt 0.322 
(5.8) 
0.264 
(5.5) 
0.838 
(22.1) 
 0.140 
(2.2) 
0.459 
(3.3) 
0.224 
(5.2) 
?2*?lnYt-1  0.187 
(3.8) 
     
?3*?lnCt-1    -0.254 
(2.9) 
0.392 
(5.3) 
  
?4*?lnCt-2 0.186 
(2.7) 
      
?4*?lnCt-3       0.204 
(3.5) 
?4*?lnCt-4    -0.214 
(2.5) 
   
Wald Test p-value        
H0: ß1 + ß2 =1 0.197 0.931 0.033 0.826 0.555 0.183 0.000 
        
2R  0.59 0.62 0.87 0.34 0.67 0.47 0.68 
SE 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.007 
SC-LM ?2(4) 5.5 5.1 2.8 5.7 4.6 7.9 4.1 
Norm ?2(2) 4.2 4.1 3.5 0.5 1.7 2.1 0.1 
Het ?2(1) 1.9 0.1 0.2 2.1 2.2 0.1 0.9 
Notes: Sample period is 1972Q2 to 1998Q4. In this table the wealth term is constructed by adding the various components of 
wealth and then taking the natural logarithm of the aggregate term. Japan does not have a constant in its estimated equation due 
to non-convergence with a constant. Dynamic terms are deleted where insignificant at the 10% level.  
 
 
significant in the first instance (the former may be considered as consistent with the evidence 
from Bonner and Dubois, 1995, and Grunspan and Sicsic, 1997) but has a t-statistic which is 
greater  than one.  The  wealth  terms  are  significant  for  the  US, UK, Germany, Italy, 
Canada and Japan and vary in size between 0.09 and 0.17. All income terms are significant at 
the 10% level and vary in size between 0.77 and 0.99. Tests for homogeneity are accepted in 
most cases. All error-diagnostics8 are statistically acceptable in Table 4.1 apart from one test 
of the twenty-one applied, Italian heteroscedasticity. 9 One point raised by Ludvigson and 
                                                                 
8 Tests include Godfrey’s test of residual serial correlation (SC-LM ?2(4)), the Jarque-Bera normality test (Norm 
?2(1)) and a LM test for heteroscedasticity (Het ?2(1)). See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) for further details. 
9 The following dummy variables were included. For the US equation DUS1 = 1 in 1980Q2 and 1981Q4; DUS2 = 1 in 
1973Q2 and 1974Q4; DUS3 = 1 in 1973Q4; and DUS4 = 1 in 1973Q3. The UK: DUK1 = 1 in 1979Q2 and -1 in 1979Q3; 
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Steindel (1999) is that results such as these may be dependent upon the sample period chosen. 
Interestingly, and in contrast to the results shown below for a sample period excluding the 
1990s, there is an increase in the size of the wealth effect for the US from 0.071 to 0.100 after 
we include the mid 1990s in our sample period in Table 4.1.  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )6.57.29.21.204.38.0
ln*367.0ln*206.0ln*071.0ln*900.0ln*203.0028.0ln 2111
=
D+D+---=D ----
t
YCWYCC tttttt  
  1972Q2 to 1992Q4 2R = 0.62, S.E. = 0.005, SC-LM ?2 (4)=2.7, Norm ?2 (2) = 0.8, Het ?2 (1) = 1.6 
 
This implies that not only have asset holdings become much more sizeable for 
American consumers in the 1990s, as shown in Chart 8, but also the response of consumption 
to a given percentage increase in them has also risen. This is in contrast to Ludvigson and 
Steindel (1999) who report a significant wealth effect from a sample of forty-four years since 
1953 but a relatively small and insignificant wealth effect when they have a sample period 
which consists of predominantly the 1990s. As pointed out by Poterba (2000), this latter result 
may be driven by the small span of data that these authors use in this case (their sample 
begins in 1986Q1 and ends in 1997Q4). We tested the residuals for the US equation from 
Table 4.1 using Andrews’ (1993) Supremum Wald (SupW) test and Andrews and Ploberger’s 
(1994) Exponential Wald (ExpW) tests for a single structural break. Using bootstrapped 
critical values from Hansen (2000) we could not reject the null of stability at the 5% level, 
although there was some evidence of instability at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
DUK2 = 1 in 1980Q4 and -1 in 1981Q1; DUK3 = 1 between 1990Q2 and 1998Q4; DUK4 = 1 in 1980Q2. Germany DGE1 = 
1 in 1990Q1; DGE2 = 1 in 1978Q2; DGE3 = 1 in 1979Q2; DGE4 = 1 in 1979Q1. France DFR1 = 1 in 1974Q4; DFR2 = 1 in 
1984Q4; DFR3 = 1 from 1992Q1 and 1998Q4. Canada DCN1 = 1 in 1982Q1; DCN2 = 1 in 1974Q4; DCN3 = 1 from 
1981Q2 to 1986Q2; DCN4 = 1 from 1972Q2 to 1979Q1; DCN5 = 1 from 1996Q1 to 1998Q4. Japan DJP1 = 1 in 1974Q1; 
(b) DJP2 = 1 in 1997Q2. 
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4.2 Disaggregated Wealth Results 
The next step in our investigation involved direct disaggregation of the long-run 
wealth term into sub-components, while allowing free estimation of the long run effects of 
these variables. We initially attempted a full disaggregation with six wealth terms similar to 
that discussed in Section 4. But here we faced problems in terms of the non- linear estimation, 
with lack of convergence or implausible coefficients. This was to be expected since the data 
are unlikely to be able easily to distinguish separate effects from six categories of asset and 
liability. This led us to estimate using a simpler disaggregation of wealth. We sought to 
distinguish between net liquid assets (liquidity less bank lending excluding  mortgage  debt)  
and  net  illiquid  assets  (shares, bonds, life and pension funds less mortgage debt). We 
contend that mortgages, being long term (10-25 years in maturity) are much more 
appropriately included with illiquid than liquid instruments, although we acknowledge that 
this is not current practice in some countries (such as the UK). In the case of Germany there 
was a problem with this approach since the estimate of mortgage debt exceeded 
 
Table 4.2.1 Consumption Functions with Disaggregated Wealth 
 US UK Germany France Italy Canada Japan 
a1*lnCt-1 -0.166 
(3.2) 
-0.119 
(2.5) 
-0.319 
(4.9) 
-0.130 
(4.0) 
-0.042 
(2.0) 
-0.265 
(4.5) 
-0.126 
(2.6) 
ß1*lnYt-1 0.928 
(16.2) 
0.950 
(7.1) 
0.856 
(19.0) 
1.044 
(8.3) 
0.896 
(2.0) 
0.787 
(15.4) 
0.887 
(20.2) 
ß2*lnW[LQ],t -1 -0.022 
(0.8) 
-0.065 
(0.5)  
0.051 
(1.1) 
0.026 
(0.3) 
0.103 
(0.7)  
0.025 
(2.2)  
-0.015 
(0.2) 
ß3*lnW[ILQ],t -1 0.058 
(2.9) 
0.111 
(2.4) 
0.051 
(2.0) 
0.025 
(2.6) 
0.031 
(1.4) 
0.136 
(6.9) 
0.108 
(3.2) 
ß4*lnW[MO],t -1   0.008 
(0.2) 
    
        
2R  0.59 0.62 0.86 0.34 0.66 0.47 0.69 
SE 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.007 
SC-LM ?2(4) 4.4 5.4 1.5 5.2 5.0 8.2 4.1 
Norm. ?2(2) 3.5 4.0 3.8 0.3 1.3 2.4 0.1 
Het. ?2(1) 2.3 0.1 0.1 3.1 2.7 0.0 1.1 
Notes: Sample period is 1972Q2 to 1998Q4. The wealth terms are ß2*lnW[LQ],t -1 which comprises liquid 
assets less bank borrowing, ß3*lnW[ILQ],t -1 which is illiquid assets less mortgage debt except for Germany 
and ß4*lnW[MO],t-1  in the case of Germany is solely mortgage debt. 
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illiquid assets: this necessitated a further disaggregation of German wealth to include a 
separate variable for mortgage debt. 
As is normal practice, we construct liquid and illiquid wealth by adding the 
components and then logging the variables. This implies that the coefficients on the sub-
aggregates should not bear a direct relationship to the coefficients on the aggregate wealth 
terms contained in Table 4.1. Despite this caveat the coefficients will nevertheless give us a 
strong indication of the relative importance of the components of wealth. An alternative 
method of restricting the coefficients on the logged components on wealth was tried and did 
not provide qualitatively different results. Note that these results are not nested in the results 
for aggregate wealth in Table 4.1 – we assess nested results in Section 4.4 below. 
Summarising the disaggregated results, there is a broad pattern of larger and more 
significant coefficients for illiquid than liquid assets, except for Italy where both are 
insignificant. In France the coefficient on illiquid assets is small but significant. The estimated 
long-run elasticity on illiquid assets vary from 0.03 to 0.16, with the US being at the low end. 
Note that Table 4.2.1 exc ludes the dynamic and dummy coefficients to avoid repetition. One 
possible distinction is between Canada, the US, UK and Germany on the one hand and France 
and Italy on the other, since credit rationing for the household sector has probably been 
prevalent more recently for the latter countries, whereas financial liberalisation took place 
quite early in our sample for the former. Hence, there are stronger “life cycle” effects for the 
predominantly English speaking countries, while the Continental Europeans are more 
“liquidity constrained”. Additionally we could be picking up the difference between equity 
behaviour in continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries with the relative size of these 
countries’ coefficients on illiquid wealth, ß3. Germany may appear to be somewhat of an 
outlier; we discuss this further below. 
Instability in the parameter estimates is highlighted once again in Figure 4.1, where we 
plot the rolling regression estimate of the US coefficient on liquid wealth. We can see quite  
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 Coefficient of USDISLQ(-1) and its two*S.E. bands based on rolling OLS
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Figure 4.1 Rolling Regression Estimate of Coefficient on Liquid Wealth for US 
 
clearly that there is a fall in the estimated elasticity of liquid assets in the 1990s, with the 
coefficient becoming not only insignificant but also the wrong sign. This is consistent with 
our view that the relationship between wealth and income has changed recently, consequent 
on the removal of liquidity constraints.10 
As a means of increasing the robustness of our results, we proceeded to undertake 
Arnold Zellner’s (1962) SURE estimation. If the disturbances across countries are correlated 
then there are useful efficiency gains from using SURE (Greene, 1993). We may expect that 
the residuals are correlated in this context due to, for example, stock market contagion having 
possibly a common impact on G7 consumption. Table 4.2.2 contains our main results on 
disaggregate wealth data using SURE. Again the illiquid wealth coefficient is typically larger 
than the liquid coefficient (except for France) and significant (except for Italy). As in the OLS 
estimation, there is a significant effect from Canadian liquid assets. Nevertheless this is only a 
tenth of the size of the coefficient on illiquid assets. The coefficients themselves for the long-
run parameters on income and wealth have to be divided by the error correction coefficient 
before they become comparable to the coefficients in Table 4.1. Because of this the long-run  
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Table 4.2.2 SURE Estimation Results with Disaggregate Wealth 
 US UK Germany France Italy Canada Japan 
a1*lnCt-1 -0.169 
(3.6) 
-0.121 
(2.8) 
-0.343 
(5.6) 
-0.135 
(4.4) 
-0.052 
(2.5) 
-0.271 
(5.1) 
-0.117 
(2.5) 
ß1*lnYt-1 0.158 
(3.2) 
0.113 
(2.9) 
0.298 
(5.1) 
0.143 
(3.4) 
0.051 
(1.5) 
0.217 
(4.4) 
0.104 
(2.8) 
ß2*lnW[LQ],t -1 -0.004 
(1.0) 
-0.003 
(0.3) 
0.015 
(1.1) 
0.001 
(0.0) 
0.004 
(0.7) 
0.008 
(2.6) 
-0.002 
(0.3) 
ß3*lnW[ILQ],t -1 0.009 
(3.3) 
0.011 
(3.5) 
0.016 
(2.3) 
0.003 
(3.1) 
0.002 
(2.0) 
0.035 
(5.9) 
0.012 
(2.6) 
ß4*lnW[MO],t -1   -0.001 
(0.1) 
    
        
2R  0.58 0.65 0.87 0.33 0.66 0.46 0.69 
SE 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.007 
DW 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.0 
Het. ?2(1) 1.8 0.1 0.0 2.6 2.5 0.1 1.0 
Notes: Sample period is 1972Q2 to 1998Q4. The wealth terms are ß2*lnW[LQ],t -1 which comprises liquid 
assets less bank borrowing, ß3*lnW[ILQ],t-1 which is illiquid assets less mortgage debt except for Germany 
and ß4*lnW[MO],t -1  in the case of Germany is solely mortgage debt. To make our SURE and single 
equation results comparable it is necessary to divide the long-run coefficients (ßi) by the error correction 
term (a1). 
 
Table 4.2.3 Wald Tests for Equivalence of G7 Coefficients  
  Income   Liquid Wealth  Illiquid Wealth 
  Test  
Statistic 
p-value  Test  
Statistic 
p-value  Test  
Statistic 
p-value 
US 
= UK 
 -0.003 [.979]  -0.002 [.985]  0.040 [.328] 
UK= 
Germany 
 -0.063 [.621]  0.070 [.546]  -0.048 [.264] 
Germany 
= France 
 0.195 [.096]  -0.044 [.604]  -0.022 [.349] 
France 
= Italy 
 -0.084 [.808]  0.075 [.587]  0.007 [.741] 
Italy = 
Canada 
 -0.181 [.584]  -0.045 [.709]  0.097 [.000] 
Canada 
= Japan 
 0.096 [.149]  -0.049 [.457]  -0.023 [.527] 
Joint Test Statistic ?2(18) = 61.179 p-value = 0.000 
 
 
coefficients as displayed in Table 4.2.2 should not be compared across countries without a 
further transformation. 
We went on to conduct formal tests to examine the equivalence of coefficients across 
countries. To do so it is necessary to divide the long-run relations by the coefficient on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 The estimated coefficient in Figure 4.1 should be divided by the estimated US error correction term in Table 
4.2.1 to allow the results to be directly comparable. 
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error correction term. We can then implement joint Wald Tests using n individual results, 
which are distributed as a ?2(n) statistics under the null of homogeneity. In particular, the test 
undertaken is of equivalence to the US results. 
Overall, in Table 4.2.3, the joint test statistic that the US long run coefficients are 
equal to those of the other G7 members is strongly rejected. Nevertheless there is quite a 
considerable similarity amongst our countries’ coefficients as the large majority of probability 
values accept the null of homogeneity of coefficients across countries. Indeed, all liquid 
wealth statistics are equivalent across countries which suggest that not only are liquid assets 
unimportant as a component of wealth’s impact on consumption but they are equally 
unimportant across countries. We then tested the joint hypothesis that the coefficients on 
illiquid wealth were homogenous and this was accepted at the 5% significance level with a 
test statistic of ?2 (5) = 10.317 [P-value = 0.068], although we excluded Canada since it 
appears to be an outlier in this part of the analysis. Additionally we tested whether this group 
of countries’ estimated liquid wealth coefficients could be restricted to zero and this was 
accepted with a test statistic of ?2 (6) = 2.75687 [P-value = 0.839]. This supports our major 
hypothesis. 
It is also interesting to test whether there is similar behaviour for the UK and, as it 
stands at the moment, the three other G7 countries with a single monetary authority. We do so 
by comparing Germany, UK, France and Italy and the results are given in Table 4.2.4. 
Table 4.2.4 Wald Tests for Equivalence of European Coefficients  
  Income   Liquid Wealth  Illiquid Wealth 
  Test  
Statistic 
p-value  Test  
Statistic 
p-value  Test  
Statistic 
p-value 
       
UK= 
Germany 
-0.063 [.621] 0.070 [.546] -0.048 [.264] 
Germany 
= France 
0.194 [.096] -0.044 [.604] 0.022 [.349] 
France  
= Italy 
-0.084 [.808] 0.075 [.587] 0.007 [.741] 
Joint Test Statistic ?2(9) = 8.225 p-value = 0.511 
Notes: The individual tests examine the equivalence of income, liquid and illiquid wealth coefficients 
of our four European countries. The estimation method is SURE and sample 1972Q2 to 1998Q4 
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Individually and overall we find that the null of homogeneity is accepted for our four 
countries. 
We also considered the long-run elasticity of household equity holdings on their own. 
We have non-stock market wealth (NSW) and stock market wealth (SW) separated in our 
long run specification. The results for the US only are given below: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2.56.53.27.18.47.27.1
ln*306.0ln*179.0ln031.0ln*151.0ln*731.0ln*138.0095.0ln 21111
=
D+D+----=D -----
t
YCSWNSWYCC ttttttt
1972Q2 to 1998Q4 2R = 0.59, SE = 0.005, SC-LM ?2 (4)=6.7, Norm ?2 (2) = 4.0, Het ?2 (1) = 1.6 
 
Share ownership on its own is significant in the long-run, with a long-run elasticity of 0.031. 
This estimated coefficient is slightly smaller than the coefficient on the combined variable of 
share ownership, life assurance and pension minus mortgage debt – which has an elasticity of 
0.151. These result support the argument made above that despite their illiquidity, long term 
institutional forms of saving may have a strong effect on consumption. 11 
4.3 Nested Specification of Disaggregate Wealth 
It should be noted that the simple disaggregation approach that we have taken earlier 
is not nested within our benchmark equations estimated in Table 4.1. To check that our results 
are not the result of a non-nested disaggregation of our long-run relationship, we produce a 
disaggregation that has a separate term for illiquid assets and also one plus the ratio of liquid 
to illiquid wealth. Algebraically, 
( )1,21,11 lnln --- += ttt WWW ( ))/1(*ln 1,21,11,2 --- += ttt WWW    (11) 
This subsequently allows us to embed our nested long-run equation within our dynamic short 
run equations. 
( ) ktijtitttttt YCWWWYCC ------- D+D++---+=D lnln)/1ln(lnlnlnln 1,21,131,2211110 ggbbbaa  
                                                                 
11 We also considered how sensitive our results were to the definition of bond holdings as illiquid assets. For 
Germany it was found that once we defined them as liquid assets the illiquid assets component became 
insignificant whereas the liquid component became significant. Italy was also found to have an insignificant 
liquid asset component once we change the definition of bonds. For the other countries we do not find the results 
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Table 4.3.1 Consumption Functions with Nested Disaggregate Wealth 
 US UK Germany France Italy Canada Japan 
a1*lnCt-1 -0.151 
(3.2) 
-0.142 
(2.5) 
-0.320 
(5.1) 
-0.115 
(3.3) 
-0.086 
(3.6) 
-0.269 
(4.6) 
-0.136 
(2.7) 
ß1*lnYt-1 0.787 
(8.2) 
0.874 
(9.4) 
0.855 
(20.0) 
0.939 
(5.0) 
0.860 
(5.5) 
0.790 
(15.8) 
0.874 
(17.1) 
ß2*lnW2,t -1 0.174 
(2.2) 
0.118 
(2.2)  
0.053 
(2.1) 
0.093 
(1.2) 
0.193 
(3.6)  
0.161 
(7.9)  
0.104 
(2.7) 
ß3*ln(1+W1,t -1/W2,t -1) 0.276 
(1.5) 
0.081 
(0.4) 
0.056 
(1.2) 
0.079 
(0.9) 
0.268 
(3.3) 
0.168 
(2.4) 
0.007 
(0.1) 
ß4*ln(WGE3,t -1)   0.013 
(0.3) 
    
Wald Test p-values        
H0:ß 2 = ß3 0.372 0.733 0.950 0.282 0.009 0.911 0.185 
H0:ß 1 + ß2 =1,        
ß 2 = ß3 0.368 0.940 0.004 0.559 0.002 0.410 0.000 
        
2R  0.60 0.66 0.87 0.34 0.69 0.47 0.69 
SE 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.007 
LM–SC ?2(4) 6.3 5.3 1.5 5.2 5.0 7.9 3.9 
Norm ?2(2) 3.4 4.2 3.8 0.5 1.3 1.9 0.1 
Het ?2(1) 1.7 0.1 0.1 3.2 3.2 0.1 1.0 
Notes: Sample period is 1972Q2 to 1998Q4. The wealth terms are W2,t -1 which is illiquid assets less mortgage 
debt except for Germany and W1,t -1 comprises liquid assets less bank borrowing. In the case of Germany, we 
have separate terms for illiquid wealth excluding mortgage debt, liquid wealth and a third disaggregate wealth 
term ß4*ln(WGE3,t -1) = ß4*ln((1/W1,t -1) + (1/W2,t -1) - mortgage debt/W1,t -1*W2,t -1). 
 
 
We can then test whether the coefficients b2 and b3 are equivalent. Particularly if b3 is 
insignificant while b2 is significant, we can be satisfied that a significant coefficient on 
illiquid wealth in the above estimates is a reflection of the data and not merely our approach 
to disaggregation. We find evidence of a significant effect from illiquid wealth while the 
implicit effect from liquid wealth is zero for the US, Japan and the UK, which replicates our 
previous results. The German result is more than likely a result of bond holding which are, in 
this table, included as illiquid assets. The French results suggest there is no effect from either 
component of wealth when separated in a nested specification. Italy and Canada suggest an 
important role for both kinds of wealth holdings. 
Given our previous results we also test for stability of the regression residuals using 
the Andrews’ (1993) SupW and Andrews and Ploberger’s (1994) ExpW tests. For the US we 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
change by any quantitative and qualitative amount. These results are available included in an earlier version of 
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find no evidence of a structural break in this specification. It should also be noted that for the 
US when we restrict the combined term b3 to equal zero we discover that the coefficient b2 
falls to a size much more in-keeping with Table 4.2.1. 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )8.58.21.47.181.33.1
ln*328.0ln*192.0ln*070.0ln*890.0ln*151.0042.0ln 21,211
=
D+D+---=D ----
t
YCWYCC tttttt  
         1972Q2 to 1998Q4 2R = 0.58, SE = 0.005, SC-LM ?2 (4)=5.1, Norm ?2 (2)=3.7, Het ?2 (1)=2.1 
 
We also consider recursive regressions for this specification and in Figure 4.2 the estimated 
parameter is consistently greater that zero, and since the mid-1980s lies more than two 
standard errors from zero. Note again that the above estimated result for the US for the 
restricted nested specification is divided by the error correction term before we have a 
coefficient equivalent to the recursive estimate above. 
In Table 4.3.2 we restrict our equation where there is insignificant disaggregate wealth 
effects. Additionally we impose equality of coefficients for the wealth components, 
simplifying the results from Table 4.1 for Canada and Italy. All t-ratios are significant at the 
95% level. All equations are well specified and pass residual congruency tests at the 5% level. 
 
 Coef. of USW1A(-1) and its 2 S.E. bands based on recursive OLS
Quarters
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Figure 4.2 Recursive Regression Estimate of Coefficient on Illiquid Wealth for US 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
this paper Byrne and Davis (2001). 
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Table 4.3.2 Consumption Functions with Nested Disaggregate Wealth 
 US UK Germany France Italy Canada Japan 
a1*lnCt-1 -0.152 
(3.2) 
-0.134 
(3.4) 
-0.283 
(5.0) 
-0.133 
(4.2) 
-0.060 
(2.7) 
-0.267 
(4.7) 
-0.134 
(3.6) 
ß1*lnYt-1 0.890 
(18.7) 
0.900 
(10.8) 
0.865 
(19.9) 
1.072 
(12.8) 
0.992 
(5.3) 
0.790 
(15.8) 
0.877 
(49.9) 
ß2*lnW2,t -1 0.070 
(2.2) 
0.094 
(3.4)  
0.068 
(3.8) 
0.023 
(3.1) 
    0.101 
(6.5) 
ß4*lnWt-1     0.095 
(2.2) 
0.160 
(8.0) 
 
Wald Test p-values        
H0: ß2 = ß3 0.210 0.927 0.012 0.235 0.555 0.183 0.000 
        
2R  0.60 0.65 0.87 0.34 0.67 0.47 0.69 
SE 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.007 
LM–SC ?2(4) 6.3 5.6 1.6 5.1 4.6 7.9 3.9 
Norm ?2(2) 3.4 4.1 3.8 0.3 1.7 1.9 0.1 
Het ?2(1) 1.7 0.1 0.2 3.6 2.2 0.1 1.0 
Notes: Sample period is 1972Q2 to 1998Q4. The wealth terms are W2,t -1 which is illiquid assets less mortgage 
debt except for Germany. In the case of Germany, we have illiquid wealth excluding mortgage debt. Wt-1 
comprises net total liquid and illiquid assets. P-values less than 0.05 reject the null for the Wald tests. T-statistics 
are in parenthesis and where bold are significant at the 95% level. 
 
 
4.4 Real Non-Property Income 
In this section we utilise non-property income (NPYt) in our short and long-run 
relationship for consumption instead of real personal disposable income. As noted, real 
personal disposable income incorporates some of the components of wealth and hence we 
may be including those components twice in our linear regression results. Using data from the 
OECD Outlook database NPYt has been constructed by the following definition. 
[ ] [ ]( )[ ] ttttttttt
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The main components of non-property income are Compensation of Employees 
(WSSSt) and Total Transfers Received by Households (TRRHt) minus Direct Taxes (TYHt). 
WSSSt is adjusted for the ratio of Total Employment (ETt) to Total Dependent Employment 
(EEt) to allow for the income of the self employed. We also remove Total Transfers Paid by 
Households (TRPHt) from TRRHt. YRHt is the current receipts of households. We then deflate  
 29 
Table 4.4.1 Real Non-Property Income and Consumption (revised dynamic specification) 
 US UK Germany France Italy Canada Japan 
a1*lnCt-1 -0.151 
(3.9) 
-0.145 
(4.2) 
-0.116 
(3.0) 
-0.147 
(3.2) 
-0.060 
(3.4) 
-0.155 
(3.4) 
-0.137 
(3.2) 
ß1*lnYt-1 0.997 
(15.6) 
0.703 
(9.2) 
0.747 
(2.4) 
0.920 
(8.0) 
1.037 
(5.0) 
0.731 
(8.4) 
0.838 
(49.9) 
ß2*lnW[LQ],t -1 -0.005 
(0.2) 
0.084 
(1.0)  
0.167 
(0.8) 
0.049 
(0.6) 
 -0.036 
(0.3) 
 0.000 
(0.0) 
-0.018 
(0.4) 
ß3*lnW[ILQ],t -1 0.083 
(4.4) 
0.115 
(3.3) 
0.308 
(2.9) 
0.041 
(5.1) 
0.032 
(2.4) 
0.165 
(4.9) 
0.151 
(5.0) 
ß4*lnW[MO],t -1   -0.288 
(1.5) 
    
Wald Test p-values        
H0: ß2 = ß3 0.000 0.773 0.413 0.912 0.540 0.000 0.033 
H0: ß 1 + ß2 =1, 
ß 2 = ß3 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.704 
 
0.917 
 
0.752 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
        
2R  0.66 0.72 0.79 0.32 0.65 0.51 0.70 
SE 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.007 
LM–SC ?2(4) 7.2 7.1 6.4 6.7 6.9 5.8 4.5 
Norm ?2(2) 0.6 1.8 5.1 0.6 0.1 0.5 3.5 
Het ?2(1) 0.2 2.0 0.5 0.3 1.7 0.0 0.4 
Notes: Sample period is 1972Q2 to 1998Q4. Yt-1 in this case is Real Non-Property Income and has been 
interpolated by the quarterly sum of employee compensation and transfers. The wealth terms are ß2*lnW[LQ],t -1 
which comprises liquid assets less bank borrowing, ß3*lnW[ILQ],t -1 which is illiquid assets less mortgage debt 
except for Germany and ß4*lnW[MO],t-1  in the case of Germany is solely mortgage debt. P-values less than 0.05 
reject the null for the Wald tests. 
 
NPYt by the consumer expenditure deflator. The results in Table 4.4.1 are robust to the 
definition of the income series. We found it necessary to re-estimate a different short run 
specification due to residual specification issues. In all cases, the illiquid variable dominates 
liquid assets in size and only the former was statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level. 
In terms of choosing between real personal disposable income (RPDI) and real non-
property income (RNPI) in a long-run relationship for consumption, a number of authors 
prefer the latter on theoretical grounds (see Muellbauer and Lattimore, 1995), although from a 
statistical point of view the stationarity tests in Table A1.1 may underline the lesser precision 
of RNPI measures. To assess which measure dominates in our empirical results requires us to 
compare Tables 4.2.1 and 4.4.1. On the basis of the adjusted coefficient of determination, 
RNPI dominates for the US, UK, Canada and Japan, whereas Germany, France and Italy have 
more of the variance of consumption explained using RPDI. On the basis of the standard error 
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of the residuals there is little to differentiate the two approaches. Hence we do not find 
sufficient consistent evidence in favour of either measure of income to make a strong 
generalisation across countries on the basis of these econometric estimates. Nevertheless the 
fact our result regarding the different effects of different measures of wealth stand up across 
our two measures of income underlines the robustness of this, our principal result.  
 
4.5 Summary of Results 
We seek to bring together the results for our estimated consumption functions with 
disaggregated wealth in Table 4.6.1. In this table we only include those terms which are 
significant at 90% and above. The summarised results below clearly illustrate that the illiquid 
wealth term is dominant in most of the specifications, with the liquid wealth term typically 
being insignificant. These results were replicated with SURE analysis in Tables 4.2.2 and 
4.3.2. When we use Non-Property Income in our specification, illiquid assets again dominate. 
 
 
Table 4.6.1 Consumption and Disaggregate Wealth - Summary 
  US UK Germany France Italy Canada Japan 
Total Wealth  
 
 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.1 0.16 0.14 
MPC from 
Total Wealth  
 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 
Liquid  Insig Insig Insig Insig Insig 0.03 Insig 
 Illiquid 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.03 Insig 0.14 0.11 
Disaggregate
Wealth 
Bonds Illiquid 
Mort.   Insig     
Liquid Insig Insig Insig Insig 0.10 0.16 Insig 
 Illiquid 0.07 0.09 0.07 Insig 0.10 0.16 0.10 
Nested 
Disaggregate 
Wealth – 
Bonds Illiquid Mort.   Insig     
Liquid  Insig Insig Insig Insig Insig Insig Insig 
Illiquid  0.08 0.12 0.31 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.15 
Disaggregate 
Wealth – 
Bonds Illiquid 
And NPY Mort.   Insig     
Notes: “Insig” where the variable coefficient is insignificant at the 10% level. MPC is the Marginal Propensity to 
Consume out of aggregate wealth and is calculated by multiplying the elasticity of total wealth by the ratio of 
consumption to wealth over the entire sample period. Mort. is mortgage holdings and is separated out for German 
and French illiquid assets where it dominates the other components. NPY is Non-Property Income. 
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5. Calibrating the Impact of a Fall in Share Prices 
In order to assess the differences between the basic and disaggregated estimates in 
current terms, we sought to estimate the likely long term impact on consumption of a 25% fall 
in share prices, given the latest balance sheet observation (which varies from 1998 for 
Germany and Italy to 2000 for the UK and US). Of course, this is a highly simplified 
comparison, which ignores feedback elsewhere from the economy. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to estimate the impact of a share price fall not only via directly held equities but 
also in terms of the impact on life insurance and pension fund claims. The latter needs to 
allow for the fact that only a part of portfolios are typically in the form of equity, and also for 
the fact that there are guarantee elements in some of the related financial claims (e.g. defined 
benefit pension claims). We used the rough approximation that these effects would entail 50% 
of a fall in equity prices affecting life and pension claims in the US, UK and Canada, while in 
Germany, France, Italy and Japan it is 25%. Having made this approximation, one can 
calculate the effect of a 25% fall in share prices on net financial wealth (for the basic model 
calibration set out in Table 4.1) and on net illiquid wealth (in the disaggregated model 
calibration set out in Table 4.2.1). The results are reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
 
Table 5.1 Calibrating the effect of a 25% fall in Share Price – Coefficients and Weights  
 Coefficient on net 
wealth (basic 
equation) 
Coefficient on net 
illiquid wealth 
(disaggregated equation) 
Equity/net 
wealth 
Equity/net 
illiquid wealth 
US 0.11 0.06 0.59 0.85 
UK 0.13 0.11 0.63 0.79 
Germany 0.09 0.05 0.26 0.30 
Japan 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.56 
France 0.16 0.03 0.60 0.84 
Italy 0.10                 0.00 (insig) 0.45 0.60 
Canada 0.16 0.14 0.93 1.08 
Japan 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.56 
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Table 5.2 Calibrating effects of a 25% fall in Share Price – effects on Wealth and Consumption 
 Effect of 25% 
equity price 
fall on net 
wealth 
Effect of 25% 
equity price 
fall on net 
illiquid wealth 
Effect of 25% equity 
price fall on 
consumption  
(basic equation) 
Effect of 25% equity 
price fall on 
consumption 
(disaggregated equation) 
US -0.15 -0.21 -0.017 -0.012 
UK -0.16 -0.20 -0.021 -0.022 
Germany -0.07 -0.08 -0.006 -0.004 
France -0.15 -0.21 -0.024 -0.004 
Italy -0.11 -0.15 -0.011 0.000 
Canada -0.23 -0.27 -0.037 -0.037 
Japan -0.05 -0.14 -0.007 -0.015 
 
As shown in the first two columns of Table 5.1, the coefficient on wealth in the 
aggregated equation is higher than that on illiquid wealth in the disaggregated equation in all 
cases. In the cases of France and Italy the differences are substantial. As regards the estimated 
proportion of wealth which is affected by equity price falls, shown in the third and fourth 
columns of Table 5.1, these are often quite sizeable, reflecting the fact that the denominator is 
net of loans or mortgages. In Canada, the estimated ratio for equity-related assets to net 
financial wealth is close to 1, while illiquid wealth ratios are close to 1 for all countries except 
Japan, Germany and Italy. Moving to Table 5.2, the effect of a fall of 25% in share prices is 
correspondingly more sizeable for the countries with substantial equity holdings. Finally 
multiplying the percent change in wealth by the coefficient gives the change in consumption. 
As shown in the last two columns of Table 5.2, the effect is estimated to be largest in Canada, 
at 3.7% for both estimates; German results are also consistent at around 0.5%. Elsewhere the 
UK and Japan have a higher consumption response with the disaggregated estimate than the 
basic equation (2.2% and 1.5% compared to 2.1% and 0.7%, respectively). For other countries 
the disaggregated estimate is smaller, at 1.2% for the US (compared to 1.7% for the basic 
equation), and 2.4% and 1.0% for France and Italy for their benchmark compared with around 
0.4% and 0.0% for the disaggregate equation.  
We also calculated the effects of a fall in share prices using the estimates with non-
property income set out in Table 4.6 (not illustrated in the tables above). These in general 
gave slightly higher estimates of the effect on consumption of a share price fall. The effect in 
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the US for example is -1.8%, in Canada it is 4.5% and in Japan, 2.1%. For Italy the coefficient 
becomes significant with an estimated effect of -0.5%. 
 
6. Conclusion  
While they are by no means unequivocal, there is considerable evidence from the 
results presented in this paper that the terms on the different sub-components of financial 
wealth differ significantly, thus implying that the aggregation of wealth in a typical 
consumption function is inappropriate. Furthermore, there is evidence that illiquid wealth 
dominates the effect of conventional liquid assets. The different effects from the components 
of wealth may be seen as justified in the context of a liberalised financial system, where 
consumption is focused on life cycle considerations and lifetime wealth is held increasingly in 
securities and institutional investment. In contrast, liquid assets are held largely for 
transactions purposes and changes in their volume are less strongly related to consumption. 
The robustness of the result to different definitions of liquid and illiquid assets, within a 
nested framework and with use of non property income as an income variable strengthens the 
results for illiquid wealth. 
One implication of the results is that the conventional studies of wealth effects on 
consumption are biased as estimates of the likely response of the household sector to falls in 
equity prices. This could be of particular relevance for the United States in the short-term, and 
also in the longer term for a wider range of countries as financial market liberalisation 
proceeds, securities markets develop and portfolios resemble those of the US to a greater 
degree. Moreover, the process of ageing, which is already underway, is also driving portfolios 
towards holding more illiquid assets. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1.1 Unit Root Tests  
Variable Test Statistic Lag Length 
   
LUSC    -0.005 1 
LUSY    -0.994 - 
LUSNW   1.677 - 
LUSNPY  -1.135 - 
LUKC    0.435 - 
LUKY    -0.399 - 
LUKNW   0.666 - 
LUKNPY  -0.882 - 
LGEC    -0.292 - 
LGEY    -0.361 - 
LGENW   -0.154 2 
LGENPY  -1.140 - 
LFRC    -2.339 2 
LFRY    -1.061 3 
LFRNW   2.265 2 
LFRNPY  -3.347* 3 
LITC    -2.207 1 
LITY    -1.741 3 
LITNW  0.748 2 
LITNPY  -3.024* - 
LCNC    -2.492 - 
LCNY    -2.991 4 
LCNNW   -0.672 - 
LCNNPY  -4.032* - 
LJPC    -2.263 3 
LJPY    -4.154* 2 
LJPNW  -0.830 - 
LJPNPY  -3.472* - 
Notes: 5% critical value = -2.8897 from MacKinnon (1991). Lag length is decided by the Schwarz 
Bayesian Information criteria. 
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Chart 1: US household sector wealth composition
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Chart 2: German personal sector wealth composition
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Chart 3: French personal sector wealth composition
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Chart 4: Italian personal sector wealth composition
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Chart 5: UK personal sector wealth composition
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Chart 6: Canadian household sector wealth composition
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Chart 8: US household sector wealth / pdi ratios
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Chart 7: Japanese household sector wealth composition
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Chart 10: French personal sector wealth / pdi ratios
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Chart 9: German personal sector wealth / pdi ratios
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Chart 11: Italian personal sector wealth / pdi ratios
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Chart 12: UK personal sector wealth / pdi ratios
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Chart 14: Japanese household sector wealth / pdi ratios
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Chart 13: Canadian household sector wealth / pdi ratios
0
0 . 5
1
1 . 5
2
2 . 5
3
1970Q1    1973Q1    1976Q1    1979Q1    1982Q1    1985Q1    1988Q1    1991Q1    1994Q1    1997Q1    
%
 o
f g
ro
ss
 fi
na
nc
ia
l w
ea
lt
h
Financial wealth/pdi Debt/pdi Net wealth/pdi
